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Abstract:
This paper shows that it is possible to extend the scope of the exis-
tence of rational bubbles when uncertainty is introduced associated with
rank-dependent expected utility. This RDU assumption can be viewed as
a transformation of probabilities depending on the pessimism/optimism of
the agent. The results show that pessimism favors the existence of deter-
ministic bubbles, when optimism may promote the existence of stochastic
bubbles. Moreover, under pessimism, the RDU assumption may generate
multiple bubbly equilibria. The RDU assumption also leads to new condi-
tions ensuring the (absence of) Pareto-optimality of the competitive equilib-
rium without bubbles. These conditions still govern the existence of bubbles.
JEL classication: D81, D9, G1
Keywords: rational bubbles, RDU preferences.
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1 Introduction
This paper shows that the scope for the existence of rational bubbles can be
extended when uncertainty and rank-dependent expected utility are intro-
duced. In the framework of an overlapping generations model à la Diamond
(1965), the seminal article by Tirole (1985) proves that bubbles can arise in
economies for which the return on capital at steady state is below the growth
rate of output. The bubbleless economy must be in a state of overaccumula-
tion that corresponds to dynamic ine¢ ciency. Weil (1987) proposes a model
of stochastic bubbles using the same framework as Tirole, and nds existence
conditions that are even stronger. Di¤erent authors have introduced rational
bubbles in richer frameworks with endogenous growth (e. g. Grossman and
Yanagawa, 1993 and Olivier, 2000). But the existence of bubbles remains
linked to the same condition between the growth rate and the interest rate.
As empirical observations suggest that this condition is not fullled in general
(see Abel et alii, 1989), rational bubbles seem unlikely to arise. They may
perhaps not be the pertinent explanation to understand bubble phenomena
that actually are observed.
In recent contributions, Caballero and Hammour (2002) and Caballero,
Farhi and Hammour (2006) obtain the existence of bubbles under less strin-
gent conditions at the price of a transformation of the notion of bubble. They
build an overlapping generations model with an adjustment cost to capital
leading to two long-run equilibria. They interpret the equilibrium correspond-
ing to a higher valuation of the capital stock as a bubbly equilibrium.
This paper intends to show that it is possible to extend the scope for the
existence of rational bubbles when uncertainty is introduced associated with
a rank-dependent expected utility. A simple overlapping generations model
is studied in which the production technology depends on a technological
shock: capital return is random. In order to have a very tractable model,
there are only two possible states of the nature and the capital return may
oscillate between a high and a low value. In an economy in which capital is
the only asset, nancial markets are incomplete as two states of the nature
exist. The existence of a bubbly asset can make nancial markets complete.
Two types of bubbles are considered in this context. The rst type, called
3
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a deterministic bubble, is an asset that has the same price in both states of
the nature. The second type, called a stochastic bubble, is an asset whose
existence is conditional to the occurrence of a particular state of the nature.
As in Weil (1987), agents form their expectations according to a self-fullling
prophecy which assumes that the bubble will burst if the other state arises.
Moreover, it is assumed that agents are endowed with a rank-dependent
expected utility (RDU) function. This model has been introduced by Quig-
gin (1993) and developed by Chateauneuf (1999). A general presentation can
been found in Cohen and Tallon (2000). According to the RDU model, the
distribution of probabilities is transformed by a probability weighting func-
tion (pwf). The utility is no longer linear with respect to the probabilities
of the states of nature. This assumption can be viewed as a transformation
of probabilities depending on the pessimism/optimism of the agent. A pes-
simistic agent will give more weight to the bad state of the nature, whereas
an optimistic agent will give more weight to the good state. This assump-
tion has two implications. Firstly, the deformation of probabilities may lead
to quantitative changes with respect to the ones obtained with the standard
EU (Expected Utility) model. More precisely, our results show that pes-
simism favors the existence of deterministic bubbles and of small stochastic
bubbles, while optimism may promote the existence of big stochastic bub-
bles. Secondly, qualitative changes may arise related to the property that
the weighting of the di¤erent states can change when the associated gains
are modied: this property can lead to a multiplicity of bubbly equilibria.
Considering pessimistic agents in the case of a deterministic bubble, the
transformation of probabilities weakens the existence conditions of a bub-
ble. The interpretation is simple. By assumption, the gross capital return
is greater than 1 in the good state of the nature, while it is smaller than 1
in the bad state. Investing in the bubble provides a gross return equal to 1.
Agents invest in the bubble in order to be protected against the occurrence
of the bad state. In the case of pessimism, they put more weight on this
state and invest more in the bubble. Therefore, pessimism may support the
bubble.
Considering the case of a stochastic bubble, the transformation of proba-
bilities may weaken the existence conditions of a bubble. Assuming that the
4
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existence of the bubble is conditional to the state with a low capital return,
the bubble bursts if the state with a high capital return emerges. Therefore,
two types of bubbly equilibria may exist, associated with a low value or a
high value of the bubbly asset. If the value of the bubble is low, the state
with a high capital return remains the good state for the consumer. But
if the value of the bubble is high, it is possible that the state with a low
capital return becomes the good state for the consumer. As the consumer
assigns di¤erent weights to these two cases, two types of equilibria may exist
associated with a low value or a high value of the bubble.
In the case of a high value of the bubble, optimism promotes the existence
of this type of equilibrium. As the good state for the consumer corresponds
to the existence of the bubble, optimistic agents assign more weight to the
bubbly state and invest more in the bubble. In the end, optimism favors
stochastic bubbles.
In contrast, the existence of the equilibrium with a low value of the bubble
is favored by pessimism. Indeed, when the value of the bubble is low, the
bubbly state is the bad state of nature for the consumer. A pessimistic agent
assigns more weight to this state, which favors the existence of a bubbly
equilibrium.
In the case of pessimism and stochastic bubbles, an equilibrium may exist
associated with a value of the bubble such that the two states of nature lead
to equal levels of consumption. Moreover, this bubbly steady state may be
stable and there is convergence with oscillations. There exists an innity of
initial conditions for the value of the bubble and the bubbly equilibrium is
indeterminate. The existence of such an equilibrium is due to the "kink" in
the indi¤erence curves which appears for equal levels of consumption, in the
two states of nature in the RDU framework.
This result can be related to previous ones obtained in nance literature
with rank dependant utility or Choquet utility: Tallon (1997) and Epstein
and Wang (1994) also obtain the existence of multiple equilibria. The origi-
nality of this work is to obtain the result in a production economy with capital
and a bubbly asset. Bosi and Seegmuller (2010) have also developed a frame-
work in which there exists an indeterminate bubbly equilibrium. In their
model, indeterminacy is due to frictions introduced via a cash-in-advance
5
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constraint with nancial market imperfections.
This paper successively considers di¤erent assumptions: EU preferences,
RDU preferences, deterministic bubbles, and stochastic bubbles. For each
case, the existence conditions of bubbles are related to the Pareto optimal-
ity properties of the economy without bubbles. As expected, bubbles can
only appear in an economy for which the competitive equilibrium is not
Pareto optimal. For RDU preferences, the condition ensuring Pareto opti-
mality also depends on the transformation of probabilities implied by the
pessimism/optimism of the agents. Therefore, it cannot be reduced to a
comparison between the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy. It
provides an additional degree of freedom that may reconcile the existence of
bubbles with parameters that are empirically relevant. The study of Pareto
optimality in the paper is based particularly on previous articles that have
studied Pareto optimality of allocations in overlapping generations models
with stochastic shocks, such as Peled (1984), Peled and Aiyagari (1991),
Wang (1993), Gottardi (1996) and Demange and Laroque (1999).
Section 2 presents the basic framework with EU preferences and a com-
petitive equilibrium without bubbles. A condition ensuring the Pareto op-
timality of this equilibrium is derived. Section 3 studies the existence of
deterministic and stochastic bubbles in this framework. Section 4 introduces
RDU preferences and derives new existence conditions for bubbles. Section
5 concludes. Appendixes are presented in Section 6
2 The basic model
2.1 The competitive equilibrium without bubbles
The basic setup is an overlapping generations model with capital accumula-
tion à la Allais (1947)-Samuelson (1958)-Diamond (1965). Agents live during
two periods. They supply one unit of labor in the rst period (when young)
and they are retired and consume the proceeds of their savings in the second
period (when old). The number of agents in each generation is normalized
to 1.
There is a single good in the economy, produced in period t with capital
6
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Kt 1 (the capital stock results from t 1 savings) and labor Lt. In each period
t exists one competitive rm using a linear production technology
Yt = R(t)Kt 1 + wLt
Capital depreciation is completed in one period. Labor productivity is con-
stant and equal to w: Capital productivity R(t) follows a random process
that depends on the state of the nature t: At each period t, t 2 f1; 2g :
State 1 occurs with probability  and state 2 with probability 1   : For
t = i; i = 1; 2; R(i) will be denoted Ri and it is assumed that
R1 > 1 > R2
In each period t; t is known by agents before they make their choices.
Under perfect competition, it is straightforward thatw will be the equilibrium
value of the wage and R(t) the capital gross rate of return.
An agent born in t knows the state of the economy for t; but not for t+1:
ct is the rst period consumption, st is the amount of savings, and dt+1 is
the second period consumption that is a random variable in t. The budget
constraints of the agent are:
ct + st = w (1)
dt+1 = R(t+1)st (2)
The agent is endowed with an intertemporal utility function. The utility
function of a generation t agent is:
ln ct + Et ln(dt+1) (3)
Et is the expectation taken in period t: Maximizing (3) under budget con-
straints (1) and (2) gives the results:
ct =
w
1 + 
st =
w
1 + 
dt+1 =
R(t+1)w
1 + 
7
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Results do not depend on  as the VNM function is logarithmic.
The capital stock used in period t+ 1 results from savings in t :
Kt =
w
1 + 
Therefore, after one period, the capital stock reaches a constant value.
In t = 0; the initial value of the capital stock K 1 is given, as the con-
sumption level of the rst old agent: d0 = R(0)K 1:
2.2 Pareto optimality of the competitive path
A standard result in deterministic models is that the existence of nancial
bubbles is possible only in economies that are ine¢ cient. If uncertainty is
removed from the model (R(1) = R(2) = R), dynamic e¢ ciency is obtained
for R > 1:
In an economy with uncertainty, the appropriate concept of Pareto opti-
mality for allocation is interim optimality (see Demange and Laroque (1999)).
A feasible allocation is interim optimal if no other feasible allocation exists
that, almost surely, yields a higher expected utility for all periods t with a
strict improvement on a set of states of positive measure.
Interim Pareto optimality can be translated in this framework as follows.
Firstly, the notion of feasible path is introduced. In period t, the resource
constraint of the economy can be expressed as:
ct + dt +Kt = R(t)Kt 1 + w (4)
A feasible path is an allocation (ct; dt; Kt)t0; starting from a given value for
K 1; that satises the resource constraint (4) for all t:
Proposition 1 If

R1
+
1  
R2
< 1 (5)
the competitive equilibrium is interim Pareto optimal.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
8
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.05
The proposition shows that interim Pareto optimality is preserved if the
low value of R2 in the bad state is compensated by a high enough value
of R1 in the good state. It is interesting to note that if (5) holds, then
R1+(1 )R2 > 1: Therefore, Pareto optimality needs a stronger condition
than an average interest rate higher than the growth rate of capital.
3 The equilibrium with nancial bubbles
This section assumes the existence of a bubble asset. This asset is a pure
bubble, with a fundamental value equal to 0. Two types of bubbles are
studied: one is called a bubble "à la Tirole" which is "deterministic", while
the second is a bubble "à la Weil" which is "stochastic". The deterministic
bubble is a deterministic asset that has the same price in the two states of
the nature. The stochastic bubble only exists in state 2 (the bad state of
the nature). Its existence is therefore conditional to the continuation of this
state and at each period, the bubble has a probability  of exploding in the
next period.
3.1 Existence of an equilibrium with a deterministic
bubble
It is assumed that a bubble asset is available in the economy in a xed
quantity normalized to 1: Its price is pt in period t: The budget constraints
of a generation t agent become:
ct + st + ptxt = w (6)
dt+1 = R(t+1)st + pt+1xt (7)
xt is the demand for the bubble asset.
9
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Maximizing (3) under budget constraints (6) and (7) gives the results:
ct =
w
1 + 
(8)
st =
w
1 + 
 

1  ptR2
pt+1
  1  
ptR1
pt+1
  1
!
(9)
pt+1xt =
w
1 + 
"
(1  )R1
ptR1
pt+1
  1  
R2
1  ptR2
pt+1
#
(10)
Equilibrium conditions on the bubble and capital markets imply:
xt = 1 (11)
Kt = st (12)
Condition (11) with (10) gives the dynamics of the price of the bubble:
pt+1 =
w
1 + 
"
(1  )R1
ptR1
pt+1
  1  
R2
1  ptR2
pt+1
#
This dynamics has two steady states, 0 which is stable and a positive sta-
tionary state p that is unstable:
p =
w
1 + 

(1  )R1
R1   1  
R2
1 R2

At this stationary state, the value of savings is:
s =
w
1 + 


1 R2  
1  
R1   1

Finally, this equilibrium exists only if p and s are positive, which gives:

R1
+
(1  )
R2
> 1 (13)
R1 + (1  )R2 > 1 (14)
When the second condition (14) does not hold, it is straightforward
enough to show that a bubbly equilibrium exists without investment in cap-
ital. This equilibrium is associated with a constant value of the bubble:
p =
w
1 + 
10
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The existence of this equilibrium is related to the assumption of a linear
technology, that allows production to occur without using capital.
The results can be summarized by a proposition:
Proposition 2 If condition (13) holds, there exists an equilibrium of the
economy associated with a deterministic bubble.
 If (14) is satised, agents hold both capital and the bubble asset at
equilibrium.
 If (14) is not satised, a bubbly equilibrium exists with no investment
in capital.
Condition (13) is the converse of the condition that ensures interim Pareto
optimality of the competitive equilibrium. As expected, a bubbly equilibrium
can only exist in an economy that is not interim Pareto optimal.
When (14) is not fullled, two di¤erent equilibria may exist: a rst one
with capital and no bubble, a second one without capital and with the bubbly
asset. This second bubbly equilibrium Pareto-dominates the rst one (in the
sense of interim Pareto optimality). Indeed, with the bubbly equilibrium
there is no risk on the gross return of the asset that is equal to 1, and 1 is
higher than the expected return with the equilibrium with capital (1 > R1+
(1  )R2). Figure 1 gives an illustration of the di¤erent cases depending on
the values of R1 and R2: The curves are drawn for the value  = 1=2:
Remark 1 This paper focuses only on two types of bubbles: a deterministic
one that has the same value in all states of the nature; a stochastic one that
cancels out if state 1 occurs. More generally, the case of a bubbly asset that
takes two positive di¤erent values depending on the state of the nature could
be studied. It is easy to check that this type of solution does not exist in our
framework.
3.2 Existence of an equilibrium with a stochastic bub-
ble
A bubble asset à la Weil (1987) is available in the economy in a xed quantity
normalized to 1: Its price is pt in period t; conditional to the realization of
11
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state 2. Assuming that the economy is in period t in state 2, agents expect a
price pt+1 in period t+1 conditional to the realization of state 2, and a price
0 if state 1 occurs. In the case of the bubble exploding, the dynamics of the
economy after the explosion becomes the same as in the economy without
the bubble.
Assuming that state 2 occurs in period t; the budget constraints of a
generation t agent are:
ct + st + ptxt = w (15)
d1t+1 = R1st (16)
d2t+1 = R2st + pt+1xt (17)
where d1t+1 is the consumption level in state 1 and d
2
t+1 in state 2.
Maximizing (3) under budget constraints (15), (16) and (17) gives the
results:
ct =
w
1 + 
st =
w
1 + 

1  ptR2
pt+1
xt =
w
1 + 

(1  )
pt
  R2
pt+1   ptR2

Equilibrium conditions on the bubble market (xt = 1) and on the capital
market Kt = st imply:
1 =
w
1 + 

(1  )
pt
  R2
pt+1   ptR2

(18)
Kt =
w
1 + 

1  ptR2
pt+1
(19)
With the change of variable t = pt(1 + )=(w); equation (18) gives:
t+1 = R2t
1  t
1     t
This equation has 2 stationary states: 0 which is stable, and
 =
1    R2
1 R2
12
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which is unstable. This last steady state exists only if  > 0,
R2 < 1   (20)
Proposition 3 If condition (20) holds, there exists an equilibrium of the
economy associated with a stochastic bubble conditional to the continuation
of state 2.
This condition is stronger than (13): the deterministic bubble is more
likely to exist than the stochastic bubble. Indeed, the stochastic bubble has
a positive return only if state 2 arises. Moreover, the stochastic bubble cannot
exist in an e¢ cient economy: if (20) holds, (5) does not hold. A graphical
illustration of these results is shown in Figure 1, with a value  = 1=2:
4 Bubbles with a rank-dependent utility
4.1 Preferences
The agent is now endowed with an intertemporal rank-dependent expected
utility (RDU) function. Following Quiggin (1993), the distribution of prob-
abilities is transformed by a probability weighting function (pwf) :  is a
continuous increasing function from [0; 1] to [0; 1] such that (0) = 0 and
(1) = 1:
With this assumption, the preceding utility function (3) must be trans-
formed according to the following rules.
Denoting c; d1 and d2; the consumption levels when young, when old in
the state 1 and old in the state 2; the utility function is:
 if d1 > d2;
ln c+ () ln(d1) +  [1  ()] ln(d2) (21)
 if d1 < d2;
ln c+  [1  (1  )] ln(d1) + (1  ) ln(d2) (22)
13
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In abbreviated form, the utility function will be denoted by:
ln c+ E ln(d) (23)
where E is the expected value calculated with the transformed probabilities
according to (21) and (22), and d is the random variable (d1; d2; ; 1  ) :
The property () <  can be interpreted as pessimism and () > 
as optimism. An optimistic agent puts more weight on the best state of the
nature, whereas a pessimistic agent puts more weight on the worst state.
The following notations will be used from now: 1 = () and 2 =
1   (1   ). Therefore, for a pessimistic agent, 1 <  < 2; and for an
optimistic agent 1 >  > 2:
The RDU assumption has two main consequences. The rst one corre-
sponds to the deformation of probabilities, that may lead to quantitative
changes: with respect to the EU model, the agents behave as if they did
not take into account the true probabilities. The second consequence corre-
sponds to the existence of a kink in the indi¤erence curves for d1 = d2: This
property may imply qualitative change in the behaviors of the agents that
choose to consume the same level in the two states of the nature for di¤erent
price levels. In the literature on RDU preferences, it often generates multiple
equilibria.
4.2 The equilibrium without bubbles
What is the impact of the RDU assumption on the former analysis? Con-
sidering the competitive equilibrium without bubbles, it is clear that state
1 is the good state of the nature and state 2 the bad state. Therefore, the
utility function is always given by (21). Moreover, the RDU assumption has
no impact as the consumption choices do not depend on . Consumption
and savings remain equal to
ct =
w
1 + 
st =
w
1 + 
dt+1 =
R(t+1)w
1 + 
14
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The capital stock from t = 0 is equal to:
Kt =
w
1 + 
What can be said about the Pareto optimality of the equilibrium without
bubbles? It is necessary to study separately the cases of pessimistic and
optimistic agents. In both cases, the utility function is not di¤erentiable at
a point such that d1 = d2: But, if agents are pessimistic, their preferences
remain convex, whereas this property is lost for optimistic agents.
In the rst case, it is easy to adapt the result of Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 If agents are pessimistic and
1
R1
+
1  1
R2
< 1 (24)
the competitive equilibrium without bubbles is interim Pareto optimal.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
This condition is the same as the one of Proposition 1, except that 
is replaced by 1: This is due to the transformation of probabilities in the
utility function of the agent.
A condition ensuring the Pareto e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium
without bubbles is more di¢ cult to establish when agents are optimistic, be-
cause agentspreferences are no longer convex. The next proposition shows
that the preceding e¢ ciency condition remains necessary. But another con-
dition is needed that can be interpreted as a one of "moderate" optimism,
or a weak transformation of the probabilities.
Proposition 5 Assuming optimistic agents, if
1
R1
+
1  1
R2
< 1 (25)
and
R2
R1
<
"
21 (1  1)(1 2)
22 (1  2)(1 2)
# 1
1 2
(26)
the competitive equilibrium without bubbles is interim Pareto optimal.
15
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Proof. See Appendix 3.
As it is apparent in the proof, Condition (26) is needed because prefer-
ences are not convex for an optimistic agent. It guarantees that no other
feasible allocation dominating the competitive equilibrium exists in the zone
in which d1 < d2: A better intuition can be achieved in particular cases. The
following corollary studies the limit condition obtained from (26) when the
transformation of probabilities vanishes. Then, it takes a particular assump-
tion for 
() = ; with 0 <  < 1
The lower ; the more optimistic the agent is.
Corollary 1 1. In the limit case 1 !  and 2 ! ; Condition (26)
becomes R2=R1 < 1, which is true by assumption. By continuity, (26)
is fullled if the transformation of probabilities is weak.
2. Let us assume that () =  with  2 (0; 1): There exists a value
 2 (0; 1) such that (26) is satised if and only if  > :
Proof. See Appendix 4.
The rst part of the corollary shows that Condition (26) is satised in
the limit case 1 !  and 2 ! : By continuity, it is satised if the
transformation of probabilities is not too strong. The second part introduces
a particular function  that allows the transformation of probabilities to be
measured by the parameter :  can be interpreted as the degree of pessimism
(or as the opposite of the degree of optimism). The corollary allows a lower
bound  on  to be dened that represents a limit value for the degree of
optimism.
4.3 Deterministic bubbles
For a deterministic bubble, it is clear that second period consumption in
state 1 will always be greater than second period consumption in state 2, as:
d1t+1 = R1st + pt+1xt > d
2
t+1 = R2st + pt+1xt
16
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Therefore, the analysis of Section 3.1 can be used again, replacing  by 1:
A bubbly equilibrium will exist if:
1
R1
+
(1  1)
R2
> 1 (27)
It will be associated with a positive investment in capital if
1R1 + (1  1)R2 > 1 (28)
If (28) is not fullled, there exists an equilibrium in which the bubble asset
is the only asset of the economy, with a price
p =
w
1 + 
Condition (27) denes an upper bound on 1:
1 <
R1 (1 R2)
R1  R2
The case of pessimism
Agents are assumed to be pessimistic: 1 < : If
1 <
R1 (1 R2)
R1  R2 < 
a deterministic bubble exists in an economy in which there would be no
bubble if agents did not "transform" the probabilities. The interpretation of
this result is simple. Investing in the bubble provides a gross return equal to
1; which is greater than the capital return in the bad state of the nature R2:
Agents invest in the bubble in order to be protected against the occurrence
of state 2. In the case of pessimism, they put more weight on this state
and invest more in the bubble. Therefore, pessimism can play in favor of the
existence of a deterministic bubble. From Proposition 4, a bubbly equilibrium
can only exist in an ine¢ cient economy.
Figure 2 gives an illustration of the e¤ect of pessimism on the existence of
the di¤erent regimes in the plane (R1; R2): The curves are obtained under the
assumption that the pessimism generates a transformation of  from  = 1=2
to 1 = 0:4:
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The case of optimism
The condition ensuring the existence of a bubbly equilibrium remains Con-
dition (27). Optimism is unfavorable to the existence of bubbles, as agents
put more weight on the good state of the nature.
The relation between the existence of bubbles and interim Pareto opti-
mality is more complex in the case of optimism. The usual way to analyze
the impact of a bubble is to interpret it as an intergenerational transfer. In
the basic economy with standard EU preferences, when (5) is not fullled,
the existence of a bubble constitutes an intergenerational transfer from the
young to the old agents and this transfer is Pareto improving. This analysis
can also be used to understand the case of pessimistic agents. But, with opti-
mistic agents, preferences are no longer convex. If (25) holds and (26) is not
fullled, it may be possible that the economy is not interim Pareto optimal
and that no bubbly equilibrium exists. Considering the proof of Proposi-
tion 5, the competitive equilibrium without bubbles can be ine¢ cient in this
case, because the technology does not allow agents to redistribute consump-
tion from state 1 in favor of state 2. A deterministic bubble cannot solve this
problem as the bubble carries out a transfer among generations, and not a
transfer among the two states of nature.
4.4 Stochastic bubbles
4.4.1 Two types of bubbly equilibria
A stochastic bubble conditional to state 2 may induce some redistribution of
consumption between the two states of nature. For the equilibrium with a
deterministic bubble, state 1 always remains the best state of the nature. For
an equilibrium with a stochastic bubble conditional to state 2, it is possible
that state 2 becomes the good state of the nature, as the bubble bursts in
state 1. More precisely, the size of the bubble may determine which is the
best state. For a small bubble, state 1 will always lead to more consumption
than state 2. For a large bubble, the inequality can be reversed. Therefore,
it is a priori possible to obtain two types of bubbly equilibria, associated
either with d2 < d1 or with d2 > d1:
Assuming that state 2 occurs in period t; the budget constraints of a
18
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.05
generation t agent remain the same:
ct + st + ptxt = w
d1t+1 = R1st
d2t+1 = R2st + pt+1xt
Equilibrium such that d2 > d1
Assuming that the equilibrium is such that d2t+1 > d
1
t+1; the program of the
agent consists in maximizing (22) under the three budget constraints. The
results are:
ct =
w
1 + 
st =
w
1 + 
2
1  ptR2
pt+1
xt =
w
1 + 

(1  2)
pt
  2R2
pt+1   ptR2

The equilibrium conditions lead to the dynamics of the price of the bubble.
Using the variable t = pt(1 + )=(w); t follows the dynamic equation:
t+1 = R2t
1  t
1  2   t
The bubbly steady state corresponds to
^ =
1  2  R2
1 R2
It exists only if
2 < 1 R2 (29)
Moreover, the assumption that d1 < d2 must be checked along this equilib-
rium. It leads to the constraint:
2 <
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2 (30)
This last condition is stronger than (29) as R1 + 1 R2 > 1.
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Equilibrium such that d2 < d1
Assuming that the equilibrium is such that d2t+1 < d
1
t+1; the program of
the agent gives:
ct =
w
1 + 
st =
w
1 + 
1
1  ptR2
pt+1
xt =
w
1 + 

(1  1)
pt
  1R2
pt+1   ptR2

The variable t = pt(1 + )=(w) follows the dynamic equation:
t+1 = R2t
1  t
1  1   t
The bubbly steady state corresponds to
 =
1  1  R2
1 R2
It exists only if
1 < 1 R2 (31)
Moreover, the assumption that d1 > d2 leads to the constraint that:
1 >
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2 (32)
4.4.2 Stochastic bubbles and optimism
For an optimistic agent, 1 >  > 2; and thus, ^ > : Depending on the
value of the parameters, it is possible to obtain a bubbly equilibrium with
d1 < d2 and a high price level of the bubble, or a bubbly equilibrium with
d1 > d2 and a low price level of the bubble.1
Using conditions (29), (30) , (31) and (32), the following results may be
obtained.
Proposition 6 Assume that 2 < 1 R2R1+1 R2 and 1 > 1 R2 or 1 < 1 R2R1+1 R2 :
There exists a unique bubbly equilibrium with d1 < d2 and a price of the bubble
equal to ^(w)=(1 + ):
1It is not possible to obtain a bubbly equilibrium such that d1 = d2; because it is never
optimal for the consumer to choose such an allocation in case of optimism.
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Proposition 6 shows that optimism can play in favor of the existence of
bubbles. Assume that  > 1  R2: Under this condition, stochastic bubbles
cannot exist in the economy with EU preferences. If agents are optimistic, it
is possible that they transform probabilities with 2 = 1 (1 ) < 1 R2R1+1 R2 :
In this case a stochastic bubble may exist. The price of the bubble is high
enough in such a way that consumption in state 2 (the bubble exists) is
higher than consumption in state 1 (the bubble explodes). As agents are
optimistic, they put more weight on the good state and invest more in the
bubble.
Proposition 7 corresponds to the converse case of a low price of the bubble
such that d1 remains higher than d2:
Proposition 7 Assume that 1 < 1   R2 and 2 > 1 R2R1+1 R2 : There exists
a unique bubbly equilibrium with d1 > d2 and a price of the bubble equal to
(w)=(1 + ):
As  < 1 < 1   R2; a necessary condition for the existence of such
an equilibrium is that there exists a bubbly equilibrium in the economy with
EU preferences (see condition (20)). Moreover agents need to be not too opti-
mistic, in such a way that 1 and 2 remain in the interval

1 R2
R1+1 R2 ; 1 R2

:
A last case remains to be studied, if
2 <
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2 < 1 < 1 R2
In this case, all preceding conditions (29), (30) , (31) and (32) are fullled.
But, it does not imply that the two types of bubbly equilibria can exist
together. Indeed, in the case of optimistic agents, preferences are not convex.
It is possible that two di¤erent solutions satisfy the marginal conditions of the
consumer program, one with d1 < d2, the other one with d1 > d2: Therefore,
it is necessary to compare the utility levels associated with the two solutions.
This is done in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The function  is dened according to:
() =  ln


R1
1 R2

+ (1  ) ln(1  )
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Assuming
2 <
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2 < 1 < 1 R2
there exists two cases:
 If (2) > (1) then a bubbly equilibrium with d1 < d2 exists and the
price of the bubble is equal to ^(w)=(1 + ):
 If (2) < (1) then a bubbly equilibrium with d1 > d2 exists and the
price of the bubble is equal to (w)=(1 + ):
Proof. See Appendix 5.
To summarize the impact of optimism on the existence of stochastic bub-
bles, the most interesting result is obtained in Proposition 6. Optimism may
favor stochastic bubbles with respect to EU preferences. The price of the
bubble must be high enough in such a way that d1 < d2: In that case, state 2
(the bubble exists) can be better than state 1 (the bubble bursts). Optimistic
agents put more weight on the good state and invest more in the bubble.
4.4.3 Stochastic bubbles and pessimism
For a pessimistic agent, 1 <  < 2: The preceding conditions (29), (30),
(31) and (32) allow existence conditions for the bubbly equilibria to be ob-
tained that satisfy the marginal conditions of the consumer program. But,
in the case of pessimism, another situation may exist that corresponds to
d1t+1 = d
2
t+1. This case results from the existence of a kink for d
1
t+1 = d
2
t+1:
Considering the maximization of the RDU function under the intertempo-
ral budget constraint (39), the optimal solution with d1t+1 = d
2
t+1 is obtained
if:
1
1  1 <
1 R2 ptpt+1
R1
pt
pt+1
<
2
1  2
It corresponds to the solution:
ct =
w
1 + 
d1t+1 = d
2
t+1 =
w
1+
1
R1
  R2
R1
pt
pt+1
+ pt
pt+1
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The equilibrium price of the bubble satises:
pt =
w
1 + 
pt
pt+1
(R1  R2)
1 + pt
pt+1
(R1  R2)
With the change of variable t = pt(1 + )=(w); this equation gives:
t = 0 or
t+1 =  t(R1  R2) + (R1  R2) (33)
(33) has a stationary state
~ =
R1  R2
1 +R1  R2
If R1 R2 > 1; this stationary state is unstable. If R1 R2 < 1; it is stable. In
this case, it is possible to observe convergence towards the stationary state,
with oscillations. In the case of instability, there is only one stationary bubbly
equilibrium. In the case of stability, a multiplicity of bubbly equilibria exists.
Finally, the following results have been obtained in the case of a pes-
simistic agent:
Proposition 9 Assume that 1 <  < 2:
 If
2 <
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2
a bubbly equilibrium with d1 < d2 exists and the price of the bubble is
equal to ^(w)=(1 + ):
 If
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2 < 1 < 1 R2
a bubbly equilibrium with d1 > d2 exists and the price of the bubble is
equal to (w)=(1 + ):
 If
1 <
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2 < 2
a stationary bubbly equilibrium exists associated with a price of the
bubble ~(w)=(1 + ):
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- If R1  R2 > 1; this stationary state is unstable.
- If R1   R2 < 1; it is stable. In this case, a multiplicity of bubbly
equilibria exists that converge towards the steady state with oscil-
lations.
To summarize, pessimism may favor stochastic bubbles such that d1 >
d2 with respect to EU preferences. To illustrate this point, assume that
 > 1   R2: Under this condition, stochastic bubbles cannot exist in the
economy with EU preferences. If agents are pessimistic, it is possible that
they transform probabilities in such a way that 1 = () < 1  R2: In this
case a stochastic bubble can exist. The price of the bubble is low enough
in such a way that consumption in state 2 (the bubble exists) remains lower
than consumption in state 1 (the bubble explodes). As agents are pessimistic,
they put more weight on the bad state and invest more in the bubble.
Moreover it is possible to have indeterminacy with a multiplicity of bubbly
equilibria converging towards a steady state with oscillations. This result
of indeterminacy is related to the existence of a kink on the indi¤erence
curves for d1 = d2. When d1 = d2; it is possible that di¤erent values of the
price of the bubble are compatible with an equilibrium. Similar results have
been obtained with RDU preferences or Choquet utility in other frameworks:
Tallon (1997) and Epstein and Wang (1994) also demonstrate the existence
of multiple equilibria in models of nancial assets.
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple model that suggests that uncertainty as-
sociated with RDU preferences can extend the scope for the existence of
rational nancial bubbles. Pessimism favors the existence of deterministic
bubbles, when optimism may promote the existence of stochastic bubbles.
Moreover, associated with pessimism, the RDU assumption is a new cause
of multiple bubbly equilibria.
It would be interesting to expand these rst results into a more gen-
eral framework. A rst improvement would consist in introducing di¤erent
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production technologies subject to di¤erent shocks, with many states of the
nature. Considering non-linear production technologies could also be an in-
teresting generalization.
Another development would be to assume heterogeneous agents di¤ering
by their degree of pessimism or optimism.
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6 Appendixes
6.1 Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof uses the method developed by Homburg (1992) and De la Croix
and Michel (2002). For the proof, it is useful to introduce some notations.
ht denotes a particular history from period 0 till t (the state 0 at period
0 is assumed to be known in t = 0): ht = (0; 1; 2; :::; t): Ht is the set
of all possible t-period histories from period 0: #Ht = 2t as 0 is known
in 0. The applications  and  are dened such that, for an history ht =
(0; 1; 2; :::; t 1; t) 2 Ht; (ht) = (0; 1; 2; :::; t 1) and (ht) = t:
The allocation corresponding to the competitive equilibrium is such that,
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for all t  0:
K 1 is given
d0 = R(0)K 1
ct =
w
1 + 
 c
Kt =
w
1 + 
 K
dt+1 =
R(t+1)w
1 + 
Using the following notation,
d(t) =
R(t)w
1 + 
the corresponding ex-ante utility level is:
U  ln (c) +  ln   d(1)+ (1  ) ln   d(2)
Assuming that this allocation is not interim Pareto optimal means that
there exists another feasible allocation that, almost surely, gives a higher
expected utility for all period t with a strict improvement on a set of states
of positive measure. Formally, it means that it is possible to nd an allocation
(~c(ht); ~d(ht); ~K(ht))ht2Ht; t0 such that 8t
~c(ht) + ~d(ht) + ~K(ht) = R((ht)) ~K((ht)) + w
~K ((h0)) = K 1 (initial condition given)
(feasibility), and such that 8t; 8ht 2 Ht
ln (~c(ht)) +  ln

~d((ht; 1))

+ (1  ) ln

~d((ht; 2))

 U (34)
~d(0)  R(0)K0(35)
with a strict inequality for some ht0 :
First, it is easy to check that the competitive solution (c; d(1); d(2)) in
period t can be obtained through the following program:
max
(c;d1;d2)
ln (c) +  ln
 
d1

+ (1  ) ln  d2
s.t. w = c+

R1
d1 +
(1  )
R2
d2
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As a consequence of this property, (34) implies that, 8t; 8ht 2 Ht
~c(ht) +

R1
~d((ht; 1)) +
(1  )
R2
~d((ht; 2))  c+ 
R1
d(1) +
(1  )
R2
d(2)
with a strict inequality for some history ht0 :
For a state t; t 2 f1; 2g ; the function  is dened as:
(1) = 
(2) = 1  
For an history ht = (0; 1; 2; :::; t 1; t) 2 Ht; P (ht) is dened as
P (ht) =
tQ
i=1
(i)
tQ
i=1
R(i)
and P (0) = 1: Therefore,
P (ht) =
((ht))
R((ht))
P ((ht))
For T > t0; it is obtained that
~d(0)  d0+
T 1P
t=0
P
ht2Ht
P (ht)

~c(ht) +

R1
~d((ht; 1)) +
(1  )
R2
~d((ht; 2))  c  
R1
d(1)  (1  )
R2
d(2)

> 0
Rearranging the terms that depend on the same period, the following is
obtained:
T 1P
t=0
P
ht2Ht
P (ht)
h
~c(ht) + ~d(ht)  c  d((ht))
i
+P
hT2HT
P (hT )
h
~d((hT ))  d((hT ))
i
> 0
From the feasibility constraints, it is obtained:
T 1P
t=0
P
ht2Ht
P (ht)
h
R((ht)) ~K((ht))  ~K(ht) R((ht)) K + K
i
+P
hT2HT
P (hT )
h
~d((hT ))  d((hT ))
i
> 0
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After simplications, it is obtained:P
hT 12HT 1
P (hT 1)
h
  ~K(hT 1) + K
i
+
P
hT2HT
P (hT )
h
~d((hT ))  d((hT ))
i
> 0
(36)
It is possible to write:
  ~K(hT 1)+ K = 
R(1)
R(1)
h
  ~K(hT 1) + K
i
+
1  
R(2)
R(2)
h
  ~K(hT 1) + K
i
Replacing in (36) makes it possible to write:P
hT2HT
P (hT )
h
~d(hT ) R((hT )) ~K ((hT ))  d((hT )) +R((hT )) K
i
> 0
Using the feasibility constraint leads to:P
hT2HT
P (hT )
h
c+ K   ~c(hT )  ~K (hT )
i
> 0
Finally, c+ K = w and it is obtained:" P
hT2HT
P (hT )
#
w >
P
hT2HT
P (hT )
h
c+ K   ~c(hT )  ~K (hT )
i
> 0
Introducing the notation
ST =
P
hT2HT
P (hT )
it is straightforward to check that
ST =


R1
+
1  
R2

ST 1
Therefore, if 
R1
+ 1 
R2
< 1; lim
T!1
ST = 0 and the competitive equilibrium is
interim Pareto-optimal.
6.2 Appendix 2
The proof is adapted from the preceding one, replacing  by 1. The com-
petitive solution in period t can be obtained through the following program:
max
(c;d1;d2)
ln (c) + 1 ln
 
d1

+ (1  1) ln
 
d2

s.t. w = c+
1
R1
d1 +
(1  1)
R2
d2
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As the agent is pessimistic, its preferences remain strictly convex. There-
fore, the preceding reasoning can be used: a feasible allocation (~c(ht); ~d(ht);
~K(ht))ht2Ht; t0 that interim Pareto-dominates the competitive equilibrium
must satisfy 8t; 8ht 2 Ht
~c(ht) +
1
R1
~d((ht; 1)) +
(1  1)
R2
~d((ht; 2))  c+ 1
R1
d(1) +
(1  1)
R2
d(2)
with a strict inequality for some history ht0 : Thereafter, the proof is the same,
replacing  by 1:
6.3 Appendix 3
The proof is adapted from Appendix 1. The competitive solution in period t
can be obtained through the following program:
max
(c;d1;d2)
ln (c) + 1 ln
 
d1

+ (1  1) ln
 
d2

s.t. w = c+
1
R1
d1 +
(1  1)
R2
d2
But, as the agent is optimistic, its preferences are no more convex. More
precisely, it is possible that the program
max
(c;d1;d2)
ln c+ E ln(d) (37)
s.t. w = c+
1
R1
d1 +
(1  1)
R2
d2
has its optimal solution in the domain d1 < d2: In this case the solution
results from the program
max
(c;d1;d2)
ln (c) + 2 ln
 
d1

+ (1  2) ln
 
d2

s.t. w = c+
1
R1
d1 +
(1  1)
R2
d2
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The solution is:
c =
w
1 + 
d1 =
2
1
R1w
1 + 
d2 =
1  2
1  1
R2w
1 + 
It exists only if d1 < d2; which implies:
2
1
R1 <
1  2
1  1R2 (38)
Moreover, it is the optimal solution only if the level of utility is higher than
the level for the competitive equilibrium. This condition gives the inequality:
ln

w
1 + 

+ 2 ln

2
1
R1w
1 + 

+ (1  2) ln

1  2
1  1
R2w
1 + 

> ln

w
1 + 

+ 1 ln

R1w
1 + 

+ (1  1) ln

R2w
1 + 

that can be simplied through:
R2
R1
>
"
21 (1  1)(1 2)
22 (1  2)(1 2)
# 1
1 2
It is easy to check that this last condition is stronger than (38). Therefore,
if the converse condition (26) is satised, the competitive equilibrium is the
solution of the program (37). The reasoning of Appendix 1 can now be used:
under (26), a feasible allocation (~c(ht); ~d(ht); ~K(ht))ht2Ht; t0 that interim
Pareto-dominates the competitive equilibrium must satisfy 8t; 8ht 2 Ht
~c(ht) +
1
R1
~d((ht; 1)) +
(1  1)
R2
~d((ht; 2))  c+ 1
R1
d(1) +
(1  1)
R2
d(2)
with a strict inequality for some history ht0 : Thereafter, the proof is the same,
replacing  by 1:
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6.4 Appendix 4
To prove the rst part of corollary (1), a limited development of the right
hand side of (26) is made, taking the ln:
ln
"
21 (1  1)(1 2)
22 (1  2)(1 2)
# 1
1 2
=
1
1   2

2 ln
1
2
+ (1  2) ln

1  1
1  2

 1
1   2
(
2
"
1   2
2
  1
2

1   2
2
2#
+ (1  2)
"
 

1   2
1  2

  1
2

1   2
1  2
2#)
=
1
1   2

 1
2
(1   2)2

1
2
+
1
1  2

=  1
2
(1   2)

1
2
+
1
1  2

This last expression tends to 0 when 1   2 ! 0: Therefore, condition (26)
tends to
R2=R1 < 1
For proving the second part of the corollary, condition (26) can be written:
R2
R1
<
"
()1 (1 )

(1  )(1 )
(1  (1  ))1 (1 ) ((1  ))(1 )
# 1
 1+(1 )
For a given value of , the right hand side of the inequality is an increasing
function of  that maps (0; 1) to (0; 1) : Therefore, (26) allows a lower bound
on  to be dened.
6.5 Appendix 5: proof of Proposition 8
The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent is obtained with (15), (16),
and (17):
ct +
d1t+1
R1

1 R2 pt
pt+1

+ d2t+1
pt
pt+1
= w (39)
For a steady state, the constraint becomes:
c+
d1
R1
(1 R2) + d2 = w
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that does not depend on the value of the bubble asset p and only depends
on exogenous variables. To determine if the optimal choice of the consumer
is obtained with d1 > d2 or d1 < d2; it is necessary to compare the indirect
utilities associated with the two cases. It is straightforward to calculate that
the optimal solution is associated with d1 < d2 i¤:
2 ln

2
R1
1 R2

+(1 2) ln(1 2) > 1 ln

1
R1
1 R2

+(1 1) ln(1 1)
The function
() =  ln


R1
1 R2

+ (1  ) ln(1  )
reaches it minimum value for
 =
1 R2
R1 + 1 R2
Finally, the results of Proposition 8 are obtained.
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Fig 1: existence of bubbly equilibria with respect to R1 and R2
R2=1-π
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Fig 2: effect of pessimism on the existence of bubbly equilibria
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